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Terry: Divorce Without Marriage

DIVORCE WITHOUT MARRIAGE: TAXING PROPERTY
TRANSFERS BETWEEN COHABITING ADULTS
Keeva Terry1

INTRODUCTION

Are you or someone you know living with another person in a longterm, committed relationship? The answer is probably yes, since one
out of every ten couples in the United States has chosen to live together
without marriage.2 But what happens when a couple’s relationship
dissolves, and property is divided as part of the break-up? The answer
is less than clear. Unlike marriage, there are no federal income tax
provisions that deal directly with nonmarriage.3
Nonmarriage is undoubtedly on the rise in the United States.4 Major
news outlets continue to report that more and more couples are
choosing to live together in exclusive, committed relationships without
marriage.5 Specifically, USA Today reported in a front-page story that
the number of couples choosing not to marry increased by twenty-five
percent in ten years.6 Yet, despite this growing group of taxpayers,
1. Associate Professor of Law, Howard University School of Law. A.B., Harvard University;
M.B.A., University of Michigan; J.D., Columbia University. I would like to express my profound
gratitude and heartfelt appreciation to my student research assistants who have provided invaluable
assistance over the years.
2. See generally Families and Living Arrangements, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/topics/families.html (last visited Nov. 25, 2020); see also Haya El Nasser & Paul
Overberg, Fewer Couples Embrace Marriage, USA TODAY (McLean, Va.), May 26, 2011, at 1A
(“Unmarried couples made up 12% of U.S. couples in 2010, a 25% increase in 10 years, according to
Census data out today.”).
3. Patricia A. Cain, Taxing Families Fairly, 48 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 805, 825 (2008) (“It is
unclear, however, how unmarried couples will be treated when they dissolve their relationships and enter
into agreements about the division of property...there is no direct authority dealing with unmarried
couples, and so the outcome is less than clear.”).
4. See generally Wendy Wang & Kim Parker, Record Share of Americans Have Never Married:
As Values, Economics and Gender Patterns Change, PEW RES. CENTER (Sept. 24, 2014),
https://www.pewresearch.org/social-trends/2014/09/24/record-share-of-americans-have-never-married/.
5. See, e.g., Veronica Dagher, How to Buy a Home Together When You’re Not Married, WALL
ST. J. (Nov. 3, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-to-buy-a-home-together-when-youre-notmarried-11604399401 (“The number of unmarried partners living together nearly tripled in the past two
decades...according to the U.S. Census Bureau.”); Liam Stack, Unmarried Couples Gain in Numbers, But
Survey Finds Married Ones May Be Happier, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/07/us/pew-research-marriage-cohabitation.html (“[T]he share of
American adults who live with an unmarried partner has more than doubled since 1993....”); Hannah Reed,
More Unmarried Partners are Living Together. These Couples Explained Why Cohabiting Works for
Them., CHI. TRIB. (Oct. 11, 2019), https://www.chicagotribune.com/suburbs/post-tribune/ct-ptbcouples-living-together-st-1013-20191011-arz7klkiozdgvfujl4j755lhzi-story.html (“[T]he number of
unmarried partners living together has increased by more than 13 million since 1996....”).
6. El Nasser & Overberg, supra note 2 (“Unmarried couples made up 12% of U.S. couples in
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there is no direct authority providing federal income tax guidance to
cohabiting adults.7 As a result, scholars and practitioners differ in their
analyses regarding the taxation of property transfers between
cohabiting adults upon dissolution of their relationship.
Scholars and practitioners agree that a transfer of property between
spouses, or a transfer between former spouses incident to divorce, is
not a taxable event. There is no consensus, however, regarding the tax
consequences of a property transfer between cohabiting adults upon
dissolution of their relationship.8
Currently, there are two
contradictory approaches. The first approach treats property transfers
between cohabiting adults as taxable events akin to a taxable sale or
exchange.9
This approach essentially disregards the personal
relationship between the parties and treats the transfer like a
transaction between strangers.10 The second approach treats property
transfers between cohabiting adults as nontaxable events similar to a
nontaxable gift.11 This approach accords great significance to the
personal relationship between the parties and treats the transfer in a
manner virtually identical to a property transfer between married
persons, even though the parties have made the conscious choice not
to marry. The consequences of this divergence in views impact
millions of dollars in federal tax revenue and present a legal quandary
for those involved.
Sadly, the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) continues to remain silent
and fails to provide clear guidance to cohabiting adults regarding the
federal income tax consequences of property transfers upon dissolution
2010, a 25% increase in 10 years, according to Census data out today.”).
7. See Anthony C. Infanti, Decentralizing Family: An Inclusive Proposal for Individual Tax
Filing in the United States, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 605, 644 (“For the nontraditional family, it is clear that
the benefits of §§ 1041, 2056, and 2523 are off limits because, by their terms, these provisions apply only
to transfers between husbands and wives.”).
8. 26 U.S.C. § 1041. See BORIS I. BITTKER, MARTIN J. MCMAHON, JR. & LAWRENCE A.
ZELENAK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS ¶ 36.09[2] (3d ed. 2002) (“Section 1041...treats
such transfers as nontaxable events.”); J. MARTIN BURKE & MICHAEL K. FRIEL, UNDERSTANDING
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION §§ 35.01–35.06 (6th ed. 2019); MERTENS LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION § 31A:63–67 (2021); MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION ¶ 5.04 (14th ed.
2018). These same tax treatises are silent with respect to the federal income tax treatment of property
transfers between cohabiting adults.
9. See, e.g., Patricia A. Cain, Taxation of Property Divisions at Dissolution of Nonmarital
Relationships, LGBT BAR (Nov. 2015), http://lgbtbar.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Taxation-ofProperty-Divisions-at-Dissolution-of-Nonmarital-Relationships.pdf (stating that family lawyers report
that they often treat all payments from one partner to the other as taxable transfers).
10. See, e.g., LEON GABINET, TAX ASPECTS OF MARITAL DISSOLUTION § 15:5 (2d ed. 2020)
(“[P]roperty divisions pursuant [to property settlement agreements in long standing cohabitations] should
not be treated as gifts.”).
11. See, e.g., Cain, Taxation of Property Divisions at Dissolution of Nonmarital Relationships,
supra note 9, and Cain, Taxing Families Fairly, supra note 3, at 805 (stating that similarly situated
families and couples, whether they are married or unmarried, should be taxed similarly).

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol89/iss4/3

2

Terry: Divorce Without Marriage

884

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 89

of their relationship.12 Given the lack of direct authority, uncertainty
persists regarding the appropriate tax treatment of property transfers for
this growing group of taxpayers. The lack of IRS guidance perpetuates
confusion on how these transfers should be treated. Therefore, the time
has come for the IRS finally to disclose public guidance to this
burgeoning group of taxpayers.
This Article proposes a theory for the taxation of nonmarriage and
provides a framework to reconcile these two contradictory approaches. It
advocates for the adoption of an interdisciplinary approach that
incorporates family law principles which recognize more fully the
changing landscape of the American family. This Article also embraces
the idea that nonmarriage should be considered a distinct body of law on
its own terms.13 The rules applicable to cohabiting adults should not
simply mirror marital provisions. Instead, laws regulating nonmarriage
should attempt to respect the myriad of choices that cohabiting adults
have made in their relationship and apply the tax consequences that flow
naturally from such choices. One size does not fit all. Facts and
circumstances do matter.14 This theory of taxation is also consistent with
a larger movement toward a substantive deregulatory model of
nonmarriage that differs dramatically from the status-based regulation of
marriage.15
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I discusses the legal bases for
the two current approaches to the taxation of property transfers between
cohabiting adults upon dissolution of their relationship. This Part
analyzes the seminal Supreme Court case United States v. Davis16 and the
legislative response to Davis embodied in Internal Revenue Code Section
104117 (“Section 1041”). Ironically, these authorities, which focus on
married persons, form the legal bases for the two current approaches to
the taxation of unmarried persons. Although the laws involving the
12. Notably, considering the demographics, this lack of guidance further marginalizes certain
already marginalized groups. See Wang & Parker, supra note 4 (“This trend cuts across all major racial
and ethnic groups but has been more pronounced among blacks.”) and (“Today one-in-five never-married
adults ages 25 and older are black....”).
13. June Carbone and Naomi Cahn, Nonmarriage, 76 MD. L. REV. 55, 58 (2016), available at
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/faculty_articles/588 (“[T]he time has come to consider ‘nonmarriage’ as
a distinct body of law on its own terms.”).
14. See id. at 57 (“Indeed, relatively few states are willing to imply an agreement, impose a duty
to share property, or provide continued support from the fact of cohabitation alone. Instead, the courts
take their lead from the parties’ formal agreements and their actions in commingling their assets. As
though they were dealing with business partnerships, the courts unwind the parties’ financial
entanglements in accordance with express contract terms and the law of unjust enrichment.”).
15. See id. at 58 (“[T]he laws governing financial obligations [between cohabiting adults] are
moving toward a deregulatory model that differs radically from the status-based regulation of
marriage....”).
16. United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962).
17. 26 U.S.C. § 1041.
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distribution of marital property do not apply directly to the division of
property following a cohabiting relationship, scholars and practitioners
have looked to these laws for guidance in the same way judges have
sometimes done.
Part II provides a framework to resolve the conflict based on an
interdisciplinary approach to the taxation of nonmarriage. Utilizing
principles of family law, this Part encourages consideration of the
individual facts and circumstances in a cohabiting relationship to
determine the appropriate tax treatment of a property transfer upon
dissolution of the relationship.18 Consistent with a deregulatory model of
nonmarriage, this proposed framework recognizes the plethora of
possible choices made by cohabiting adults and accepts the reality that
such choices may yield varying tax consequences.
Part III describes the benefits of adopting this proposed framework.
First, this Part explains why an interdisciplinary approach is beneficial
from a legal and a social perspective. Second, this Part discusses how this
proposed framework reinforces long established principles in federal tax
law which dictate that state law determines ownership and state law
creates property rights.19 Finally, this Part maintains that the economic
realities present in a cohabiting relationship should determine the tax
treatment of a property transfer upon dissolution of the relationship, and
that this approach is consistent with federal income tax jurisprudence
which states that the substance of a transaction, not its mere form, will
control the tax treatment.

18. See LYNN DENNIS WARDLE & LAURENCE C. NOLAN, FAMILY LAW IN THE USA §§ 700, 706
(2011) (Facts and circumstances to consider may include, inter alia, the length of the relationship; the age
and physical and emotional health of the parties; the income or property brought to the relationship by
each person; the standard of living established during the relationship; any written agreement made by the
parties before or during the relationship concerning property distribution; the economic situation of each
person at the time the division of property becomes effective; the income and earning potential of each
person; the contribution by each person to the education, training or earning power of the other person;
the contribution of each person as to the acquisition of any property as well as the contribution of a person
as a homemaker; the tax consequences to each person; the market and emotional value of the assets; the
need for the custodial parent to remain in the home and keep possession of household effects; the debts
and liabilities of each person and the ability of each person to pay those debts.); see also ECONOMIC
RIGHTS OF UNMARRIED COHABITANTS ACT, at 3 (Nat’l Conf. of Commissioners on Uniform State L.,
Discussion
Draft
2021),
available
at
https://www.uniformlaws.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=8
c8ca36d-9185-a9db-9fb4-5c53428a8e89&forceDialog=0.
19. See Keeva Terry, Separate and Still Unequal? Taxing California Registered Domestic
Partners,
39
U.
TOL.
L.
REV.
633,
641
(2008),
available
at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1267328.
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DAVIS AND SECTION 1041: POLAR OPPOSITES SETTING THE
STANDARD

Currently, the taxation of nonmarriage incorporates two contradictory
approaches. The first approach treats a property transfer between
cohabiting adults upon dissolution of their relationship like a taxable sale
transaction.20 Some scholars and practitioners believe such property
transfers should be considered taxable events akin to arm’s length
transactions, and United States v. Davis is often cited as support for their
position.21 The Davis decision illustrates the well-established rule that,
unless both parties have an ownership interest in the property, a transfer
of property from one person to another generally constitutes a taxable
exchange in which gain or loss must be recognized by the transferor of
the property.22
Others contend, however, that a property transfer between cohabiting
adults upon dissolution of their relationship should be treated as a
nontaxable event and viewed as a nontaxable gift under the Internal
Revenue Code.23 Section 1041 is often cited as support for this position;
it provides that any transfer between former spouses incident to the
divorce shall be treated as a nontaxable gift.24 The second approach
advocates for the same tax treatment of property transfers between
cohabiting adults upon dissolution of their relationship as the federal
income tax treatment of property transfers between former spouses
incident to their divorce. These advocates assert that the emotional and
financial connections present in a cohabiting relationship are substantially
similar to those present in a marriage. Therefore, the federal income tax
treatment of property transfers upon dissolution of a cohabiting
relationship should similarly be nontaxable as well.
A.

United States v. Davis

Before the Supreme Court decided United States v. Davis,25 the
seminal case regarding the federal income taxation of property transfers

20. See, e.g., LEON GABINET, TAX ASPECTS OF MARITAL DISSOLUTION § 15:5 (2d ed. 2020)
(“[P]roperty divisions pursuant [to property settlement agreements in long standing cohabitations] should
not be treated as gifts.”).
21. United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962).
22. 26 U.S.C. § 1001(a); Davis, 370 U.S. at 71 (Having determined that the transaction was a
taxable event....”).
23. See, e.g., Cain, Taxation of Property Divisions at Dissolution of Nonmarital Relationships,
supra note 9, and Cain, Taxing Families Fairly, supra note 3, at 805 (stating that similarly situated
families and couples, whether they are married or unmarried, should be taxed similarly).
24. 26 U.S.C. § 1041.
25. Davis, 370 U.S. at 65.
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made incident to divorce, there was considerable confusion over how and
whether such transfers should be taxed.26 Federal Courts of Appeals
disagreed whether such a transfer resulted in a taxable gain.27 This
confusion mirrors the confusion experienced by cohabiting adults today.28
The Supreme Court ended all debate with Davis and clearly stated that a
transfer of property between spouses incident to a divorce is a taxable
event triggering potential income tax liability for the transferor of the
property.29
In Davis, Mr. Thomas Davis brought suit against the IRS to recover
federal income taxes erroneously assessed to him.30 Mr. Davis and his
former wife, Alice M. Davis, had entered into a property settlement
agreement in connection with their divorce.31 Pursuant to this agreement,
Mr. Davis transferred to Mrs. Davis 500 shares of DuPont stock, which
had been held solely in his name.32 At the time of the transfer, the DuPont
stock had appreciated in value from the time when Mr. Davis acquired
it.33 The IRS argued that the transfer of stock amounted to a taxable
exchange because Mr. Davis had transferred the stock to Mrs. Davis in
satisfaction of his legal obligations resulting from Mrs. Davis’s statutory
marital rights.34
Mr. Davis contended that the transfer of stock was a nontaxable
division of property between co-owners.35 He further argued that even if
the transfer was a taxable event, it was too difficult to calculate the fair

26. See Karen B. Brown, The Story of Davis: Transfers of Property Pursuant to Divorce, in TAX
STORIES 171 (Paul L. Caron ed., 2d ed., 2009).
27. Compare Comm’r v. Marshman, 279 F.2d 27 (6th Cir. 1960) (holding that the Commissioner’s
ruling that fair market value of property received during a property settlement due to divorce was an
“insurmountable obstacle” to determine whether a realized tax gain occurred), with Comm’r v. Mesta,
123 F.2d 986 (3d Cir. 1941) (holding that the property transfer after divorce was a taxable gain because
the property’s fair market value was readily determinable), and Comm’r v. Halliwell, 131 F.2d 642 (2d
Cir. 1942) (holding that securities transferred pursuant to a divorce created a gain realized).
28. Ordinary taxpayers have characterized cohabiting relationships as “the wild west where some
exceptionally non-intuitive [and] unjust outcomes can happen.” See, e.g., Can My Ex Boyfriend Sue Me
for Money He Gave Me?, AVVO (July 19, 2013), https://www.avvo.com/legal-answers/can-my-exboyfriend-sue-me-for-money-he-gave-me--1333371.html.
29. Davis, 370 U.S. at 71-73.
30. Id. at 66.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 66-67 (“Pursuant to the above agreement which had been incorporated into the divorce
decree, one-half [500 shares] of this [E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.] stock was delivered in the tax year
involved, 1955, and the balance thereafter.”).
33. Id. at 67 (“Davis’ cost basis for the 1955 transfer was $74,775.37, and the fair market value of
the 500 shares there transferred was $82,250.”).
34. Id. at 66-67 (“The then Mrs. Davis agreed to accept this [property] division ‘in full settlement
and satisfaction of any and all claims and rights against the husband whatsoever (including but not by way
of limitation, dower and all rights under the laws of testacy and intestacy) ....’”).
35. Id. at 69.
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market value of the marital rights Mrs. Davis had surrendered.36 As a
result, it was impossible to determine the “amount realized” by Mr. Davis
and any taxable gain resulting from the transaction.37 In a taxable
exchange, the amount realized by the transferor of the property equals the
sum of any money received plus the fair market value of any property the
transferor received in the exchange.38 If Mrs. Davis’s marital rights had
an indeterminable value, then the amount realized by Mr. Davis was also
indeterminable.39 The Supreme Court rejected both of these arguments.40
The first question the Court addressed was whether the transfer of stock
constituted a taxable event or a nontaxable division of property between
co-owners.41 The Court stated that the transfer of stock constituted a
taxable event because Delaware law did not grant Mrs. Davis any
ownership rights in her husband’s property.42 According to the Court, the
statutory marital rights granted by Delaware law more closely resembled
a personal liability of the husband instead of a property interest of the
wife.43 The Court reasoned that if Mrs. Davis had no ownership rights in
the stock that was transferred, then she was not a co-owner of the stock.44
And if she was not a co-owner of the stock, then the transfer did not
constitute a division of property between co-owners.45
Once the Court determined that the transfer of stock was indeed a
taxable event, it next addressed whether the amount realized by Mr. Davis
could be calculated with any accuracy.46 The Court reasoned that when
two parties make an exchange, it is assumed that the properties exchanged
are at least approximately equal in value.47 Therefore, the Court declared
that the fair market value of the marital rights surrendered by Mrs. Davis
is presumed to equal the fair market value of the stock surrendered by Mr.
36. Id. at 67-68.
37. Id. (“[A]lthough such a transfer might be a taxable event, the gain realized thereby could not
be determined because of the impossibility of evaluating the fair market value of the wife’s marital
rights.”).
38. 26 U.S.C. § 1001(b).
39. Davis, 370 U.S. at 67-68.
40. Id. at 66.
41. Id. at 68 (“We now turn to the threshold question of whether the transfer in issue was an
appropriate occasion for taxing the accretion to the stock.”).
42. Id. at 70 (“[T]he inchoate rights granted a wife in her husband’s property by the Delaware law
do not even remotely reach the dignity of co-ownership.”).
43. Id. (“Regardless of the tags, Delaware seems only to place a burden on the husband’s property
rather than to make the wife a part owner thereof.”).
44. Id. at 70-71.
45. Id. (“The effectuation of these marital rights may ultimately result in the ownership of some
of the husband’s property as it did here, but certainly this happenstance does not equate the transaction
with a division of property by co-owners.”).
46. Id. at 71 (“Having determined that the transaction was a taxable event, we now turn to…the
measurement of the taxable gain realized by the taxpayer.”).
47. Id. at 72.
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Davis.48
The DuPont stock had a clearly ascertainable fair market value of
$82,250.49 As a result, the fair market value of the marital rights
surrendered by Mrs. Davis was deemed to equal $82,250 and the amount
realized by Mr. Davis was similarly $82,250.50 From a policy
perspective, the Court felt it was more consistent with the general purpose
and intent of the taxing statutes to approximate the gain realized in a
taxable transaction rather than ignore such gain completely.51 The Court
held that Mr. Davis realized a taxable gain on the transfer of stock to his
former wife, and such gain could be quantified and must be recognized
by Mr. Davis for federal income tax purposes.52 Mr. Davis was taxed in
the same way he would have been had he sold the stock to a stranger for
its fair market value. In other words, the Supreme Court held in Davis
that, unless both parties have an ownership interest in the property, a
property transfer made incident to divorce should be treated as a taxable
event just like any other arm’s length sale transaction.
The holding in Davis generated a fair amount of controversy.53 The
tax treatment of property transfers between spouses involving various
forms of ownership was frequently unclear, and litigation often resulted
from varying state laws.54 Moreover, many taxpayers felt that it was
inappropriate for the government to intrude on intimate relationships, and
to tax property transfers between spouses upon divorce was akin to doing
just that.55 Davis taxed a property transfer between spouses in the same
manner as a property transfer between strangers, ignoring the obvious

48. Id. (“It must be assumed, we think, that the parties acted at arm’s length and that they judged
the marital rights to be equal in value to the property for which they were exchanged.”).
49. Id. at 67.
50. See 26 U.S.C. § 1001(b); Davis, 370 U.S. at 72-73.
51. Davis, 370 U.S. at 72-73.
52. Id. at 71-73.
53. See Stephen E. Solomon, Property Transfer Pursuant to Divorce-Taxable Event?, 17 STAN.
L. REV. 478, 490 (1965) (“[T]he Davis case is open to criticism…its result is not compelled.”); Edward
W. Turley, Jr., Divorce and Taxes-Texas Style, 48 TEX. L. REV. 721, 737 (1970) (“The Davis decision has
not been enthusiastically received by the tax bar.”); Note, Should State Courts Determine Federal Tax
Policy? Imel v. United States, 47 U. COLO. L. REV. 533, 550 (1976) (“The time has come to
overrule Davis. Imel reached the right result, but by the wrong methods. The transfer of property pursuant
to a divorce settlement should not be a taxable event, not because the state court says that it is not, but
because it is consistent with federal tax legislation and policy that it not be taxable.”).
54. See, e.g., Collins v. Comm’r, 412 F.2d 211 (10th Cir. 1969); Beth W. Corp. v. United States,
350 F. Supp. 1190 (S.D. Fla. 1972), aff’d per curiam, 481 F.2d 1401 (5th Cir. 1973); Imel v. United States,
523 F.2d 853 (10th Cir. 1975); United States v. Bosch, 590 F.2d 165 (5th Cir. 1979); Cook v. Comm’r.,
80 T.C. 512 (1983), aff’d per curiam, 742 F.2d 1431 (2d Cir. 1984).
55. See Turley, supra note 53, at 737 (“The ABA Committee on Domestic Relations Tax Problems
has advocated the overruling of Davis, stressing the point that a tax burden should not be added ‘to the
emotional and financial strains implicit in the tragedy of the breakup of a family.’”).
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emotional history present in the relationship.56 Equating spouses with
strangers also proved troublesome because it did not accurately reflect the
economic reality that spouses usually represent a single economic unit,
which is certainly not the case with strangers.57
Federal tax revenues also suffered as a result of the Davis decision.58
Taxpayer non-compliance with Davis adversely impacted the federal
budget.59 The transferor spouse would often not report any gain on the
transfer of appreciated property, even though the Davis decision
mandated such tax treatment.60 Nevertheless, the recipient spouse was
still entitled to a “stepped up basis” in the property equal to its fair market
value on the date of the transfer.61 This unfortunate combination resulted
in reduced revenue for the Treasury.62
B.

Internal Revenue Code Section 1041

In response to the controversy generated by the Davis decision,
Congress enacted Internal Revenue Code Section 1041 in 1984, which
essentially overruled the holding in Davis.63 Section 1041 created
uniformity among the several States, notwithstanding the presence of
differing state property laws. This code section unequivocally states that,
for federal income tax purposes, no gain or loss shall be recognized on a
transfer of property to a spouse or a former spouse if such transfer is
incident to the divorce.64 Thus, even when both parties do not have an
56. Note, Should State Courts Determine Federal Tax Policy? Imel v. United States, 47 U. COLO.
L. REV. 533, 549-50 (1976) (“The principal argument against recognition of capital gains on divorce
settlements, however, concerns the peculiarly noncommercial context in which divorce settlements take
place and the consequent problems of measuring ‘gain.’ Emotional factors often predominate during
settlement negotiations; financial concessions serve to assuage guilt feelings and secure cooperation,
rather than simply representing economic value received. [T]he words ‘fair market value’ would seem to
indicate that the capital gains tax is to apply to transactions of a more commercial nature than a ‘single
transaction between a husband and wife made under the emotion, tension and practical necessities
involved in a divorce proceeding.’” (citations omitted)).
57. Id.
58. See Brown, supra note 26. (“Davis was likely a net money loser for the Treasury, a factor
which must have contributed heavily to the Treasury’s decision to support a legislative abrogation of
Davis.” (citations omitted)).
59. See H.R. REP. NO. 432, pt. 2, at 1491-92 (1984) (“Furthermore, in divorce cases, the
government often gets whipsawed.”)
60. Id.
61. See Rev. Rul. 67-221, 1967-2 C.B. 63 (concluding that in a Davis situation there is no gain or
loss to the recipient spouse and the recipient spouse’s basis in the property received is its fair market value
on the date of the transfer).
62. See Brown, supra note 26 (“Davis was likely a net money loser for the Treasury, a factor which
must have contributed heavily to the Treasury’s decision to support a legislative abrogation of Davis.”
(citations omitted)).
63. See H.R. REP. NO. 432, pt. 2, at 1491-92 (1984).
64. 26 U.S.C. § 1041.
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ownership interest in the property, property transfers between spouses, or
between former spouses if such transfer is incident to the divorce, are now
treated as nontaxable events for federal income tax purposes.65
Section 1041 only applies to married couples, but many couples who
live together in an exclusive, committed relationship without marriage
generally function in the same manner as a married couple.66 They often
pool their resources and operate as a single economic unit.67 These
cohabiting relationships are substantially similar to marriage, and when
they dissolve, the emotional and financial dissolution process bears a
striking resemblance to that which married couples experience upon
divorce.68 As a result, scholars and practitioners sometimes apply the
logic and rationale for the enactment of Section 1041 to cohabiting adults,
and advocate the extension of nontaxable federal income tax treatment to
property transfers between cohabiting adults upon dissolution of their
relationship.
II. THE STATE OF STATE LAW REGARDING NONTAXABLE PROPERTY
TRANSFERS
In the years following the Davis decision,69 there was extensive
litigation questioning the taxability of property transfers made pursuant
to divorce.70 Since the holding in Davis was based on the Court’s
65. Id. See BITTKER ET AL., supra note 8, ¶ 36.09[2] (“Section 1041…treats such transfers as
nontaxable events.”); BURKE & FRIEL, supra note 8, §§ 35.01–35.06; MERTENS LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION, supra note 8, § 31A:63–67; CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 8, ¶ 5.04.
66. See Steven K. Berenson, Should Cohabitation Matter in Family Law?, 13 J. L. & FAM. STUD.
289, 290 (2011) (“[I]n at least some jurisdictions, the law considers the mere fact of cohabitation to be
sufficient in and of itself to cause a sometimes significant alteration in the legal relationship between two
parties. In some of these situations, the law treats cohabitation between unmarried partners essentially as
being equivalent to marriage, thereby extending many of the same legal perquisites that come from
marriage to such unmarried couples.”); John M. Yarwood, Note, Breaking Up Is Hard To Do: MiniDOMA States, Migratory Same-Sex Marriage, Divorce, and a Practical Solution to Property Division,
B.U. L. REV. 1355, 1365 (2009) (“Unmarried cohabitating couples share property, domestic labor,
children, and many other things that married and civilly unionized couples share.”).
67. See Anthony C. Infanti, Decentralizing Family: An Inclusive Proposal for Individual Tax
Filing in the United States, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 605, 615 (“[T]he class of potential joint return filers is
underinclusive because it excludes many nontraditional families who actually do pool financial resources
and act as a single economic unit.”).
68. See 6 FAMILY LAW AND PRACTICE §65.08 (Arnold H. Rutkin ed., 2010) (“Ending a long-term,
stable cohabitation relationship forces an individual to go through many of the same psychological
traumas that he or she would experience during a divorce.”); Yarwood, supra note 66, at 1365
(“[Unmarried cohabitating couples] also end their relationships, as many couples in legally recognized
relationships do. This type of dissolution presents many of the same problems as marriage dissolution,
especially if the couple has cohabitated for a long time.”).
69. United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962).
70. See, e.g., Collins v. Comm’r, 412 F.2d 211 (10th Cir. 1969); Beth W. Corp. v. United States,
350 F. Supp. 1190 (S.D. Fla. 1972), aff’d per curiam, 481 F.2d 1401 (5th Cir. 1973); Imel v. United States,
523 F.2d 853 (10th Cir. 1975); United States v. Bosch, 590 F.2d 165 (5th Cir. 1979); Cook v. Comm’r,
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examination of Delaware law, and Mrs. Davis’s ownership interest under
Delaware law, much of the litigation focused on the state law that
controlled the property transfer at issue.71 The critical question debated
was whether the controlling state law deemed the property transfer a
division of property between co-owners. If so, then for federal income
tax purposes, the property transfer constituted a nontaxable event. As
such, state law determinations of ownership rights and property interests
greatly influenced the federal income tax treatment of property
transfers.72 Federal tax law has a long tradition of looking to state law to
determine family relationships and ownership of property rights and has
traditionally relied on state law to define property rights, while federal tax
law has determined how those property rights should be taxed.73
Therefore, the IRS should adopt this same approach to determine the
taxability of property transfers between cohabiting adults upon
dissolution of their relationship.
Property ownership rights are often granted to cohabiting adults upon
dissolution of their relationship in the same way the court would grant
property ownership rights under similar circumstances to a married
couple upon divorce.74 As a result, Davis and its progeny provide a model
to develop a framework to analyze the federal income tax treatment of
property transfers between cohabiting adults upon dissolution of their
relationship. The individual facts and circumstances in a cohabiting
relationship should be examined and considered to determine the
appropriate federal income tax treatment of a property transfer upon

80 T.C. 512 (1983), aff’d per curiam, 742 F.2d 1431 (2d Cir. 1984).
71. See, e.g., Collins, 412 F.2d 211 (discussing Oklahoma law); Beth W. Corp., 350 F.Supp. 1190
(discussing Florida law); Imel, 523 F.2d 853 (discussing Colorado law); Bosch, 590 F.2d 165 (discussing
Florida law); Cook, 80 T.C. 512 (discussing Connecticut law).
72. Davis, 370 U.S. at 71 (“Although admittedly such a view may permit different tax treatment
among the several States, this Court in the past has not ignored the differing effects on the federal taxing
scheme of substantive differences [in state law] ….”).
73. Cain, Taxing Families Fairly, supra note 3, at 838.
74. See, e.g., Becker v. Ashworth, 252 P.3d 647 (Kan. Ct. App. 2011) (per curiam) (“Even if the
parties were not married and merely cohabitated, the court may, in its discretion, make an equitable
division of property either jointly accumulated by the parties or acquired with intent that both parties have
an interest in the property.”); Connell v. Francisco, 898 P.2d 831, 836 (Wash. 1995) (Income and property
acquired during a meretricious relationship is characterized as community property in the same manner
as if the couple had been married, and therefore, is subject to equitable division upon the dissolution of
the relationship); Goode v. Goode, 396 S.E.2d 430, 438-39 (W.Va. 1990) (While indicating a preference
for property division between unmarried cohabitating couples by contract principles, the court does allow
for equitable division of property in the absence of a contract provided a “party claiming relief must
demonstrate that equitable principles would provide the relief being sought.”); Wilbur v. DeLapp, 850
P.2d 1151, 1153 (Or. Ct. App. 1993) (In making a property distribution upon the termination of the
relationship of a non-marital cohabiting couple, “[t]he primary consideration . . . is the intent of the parties.
However…in distributing the property of a domestic relationship, [the Court is] not precluded from
exercising [its] equitable powers to reach a fair result based on the circumstances of each case.”).
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dissolution of the relationship.75 Laws regulating nonmarriage should
attempt to respect the myriad of choices that cohabiting adults have made
in their relationship and apply the tax consequences that flow naturally
from such choices, with a clear understanding that such choices may yield
varying tax consequences.76 If a transfer is deemed a division of property
interests between the parties under state law, then for federal income tax
purposes, the transfer should similarly be deemed a nontaxable division
of property between co-owners. Based on the foregoing, the following
property transfers between cohabiting adults are likely to be treated as
nontaxable events.
A.

Partition of Joint Property

If property is equally owned and titled in both names, the mere partition
of such property is generally not a taxable event. Instead, it is a
nontaxable division of property between co-owners. For example, if
Party A and Party B jointly own 100 acres of land worth $100,000, 1,000
shares of stock in X corporation worth $100,000, and a bank account of
$50,000, and each took half of each item, then no taxable transaction
results. Alternatively, if Party A takes all the land and half of the bank
account (a total of $125,000) and Party B takes all the stock and the other
half of the bank account (a total of $125,000), then no taxable transaction
results.77
75. A facts and circumstances inquiry to determine the appropriate federal income tax treatment
is not new to the IRS. For example, whether an individual qualifies as an independent contractor or an
employee for federal income tax purposes depends on the facts and circumstances of each case,
Independent
Contractor
(Self-Employed)
or
Employee?,
IRS
(Apr.
13,
2021),
https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/independent-contractor-self-employedor-employee. Likewise, whether an activity constitutes a trade or business for federal income tax purposes
depends on the facts and circumstances of each case, Business Activities, IRS (May 26, 2020),
https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/business-activities. With respect to
property interests, however, well-established and longstanding federal income tax jurisprudence dictates
that state law determines ownership and creates property rights.
76. See WARDLE & NOLAN, supra note 18, §§ 700, 706 (Facts and circumstances to consider may
include, inter alia, the length of the relationship; the age and physical and emotional health of the parties;
the income or property brought to the relationship by each person; the standard of living established during
the relationship; any written agreement made by the parties before or during the relationship concerning
property distribution; the economic situation of each person at the time the division of property becomes
effective; the income and earning potential of each person; the contribution by each person to the
education, training or earning power of the other person; the contribution of each person as to the
acquisition of any property as well as the contribution of a person as a homemaker; the tax consequences
to each person; the market and emotional value of the assets; the need for the custodial parent to remain
in the home and keep possession of household effects; the debts and liabilities of each person and the
ability of each person to pay those debts.); see also ECONOMIC RIGHTS OF UNMARRIED COHABITANTS
ACT, at 3 (Nat’l Conf. of Commissioners on Uniform State L., Discussion Draft 2021), available at
https://www.uniformlaws.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=8
c8ca36d-9185-a9db-9fb4-5c53428a8e89&forceDialog=0.
77. Hornback v. United States, 298 F. Supp. 977, 981 (W.D.Mo. 1969), cited with approval in
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In Beth W. Corporation v. United States,78 a Florida federal district
court held that the distribution of property, held as tenants by the entirety,
between husband and wife pursuant to a divorce property settlement
agreement was a nontaxable division of property between co-owners.79
This decision was affirmed by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals without
opinion.80 Jewell and Wiley Waldrep jointly held various parcels of real
property as tenants by the entirety.81 Pursuant to a property settlement
agreement entered into during their divorce proceedings, each of the
Waldreps conveyed to the other certain real properties they owned.82 The
property settlement agreement was structured to arrive at an equal
division of the total value of jointly owned property.83 The court
examined the state law of Florida and determined that a wife holding such
an interest is, in actuality as well as in theory, a co-owner of the subject
property.84 Thus, the conveyance to Jewell Waldrep of land jointly owned
by her and husband constituted a nontaxable division of property between
co-owners.85
Similarly, in Cofield v. Koehler,86 a Kansas federal district court held
that the equal division of the total value of property jointly owned by
husband and wife in the divorce decree was not a taxable event.87 Lester
and Marguerite Cofield were issued, in their joint names, a substantial
amount of United States Series E Savings Bonds.88 They also
accumulated other joint assets during their marriage, including a large
amount of real estate and considerable personal property.89 All property
was held in both names.90
At the time of their divorce, the couple did not simply divide each of

Beth W. Corp. v. United States, 350 F. Supp. 1190, 1192 (S.D. Fla. 1972), aff’d per curiam, 481 F.2d
1401 (5th Cir. 1973).
78. Beth W. Corp., 350 F. Supp. at 1190.
79. Id. at 1192 (“Thus the Waldrep transaction resembles a non-taxable division of property
between co-owners.” “Accordingly, it is the opinion of the Court that no taxable transaction took
place….”).
80. Beth W. Corp. v. United States, 481 F.2d 1401 (5th Cir. 1973).
81. Beth W. Corp., 350 F. Supp at 1191.
82. Id.at 1190.
83. Id. at 1192.
84. Id. at 1191 (“The essence of the entireties concept is that each spouse is seised of the whole
and not of a share, moiety, or divisible part.”).
85. Id. at 1192 (“If husband and wife literally divide or partition the property…so that each just
gets his own proper part, there is no taxable transaction involved.” (citations omitted)).
86. Cofield v. Koehler, 207 F.Supp. 73 (D. Kan 1962).
87. Id. at 74.
88. Id. (“The court specifically found that these bonds were the joint accumulations of the husband
and wife and were not purchased from separate funds of the wife.”).
89. Id. at 73.
90. Id.
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their joint assets in half.91 Instead, they divided their entire marital estate
in half.92 Certain jointly owned assets were transferred in full to the
husband in exchange for certain other jointly owned assets that were
transferred in full to the wife.93 The property transfers were equal in
value.94 The court ruled that the husband’s transfer of savings bonds to
his wife pursuant to their divorce decree did not result in the realization
of income to him because the property transfers had been equal in value.95
The equal division of the total value of property jointly owned by husband
and wife in the divorce decree was held to be a nontaxable division of
property between co-owners.96
The IRS adopted this position in Revenue Ruling 81-292.97 This
revenue ruling plainly stated that an approximately equal division of the
total value of jointly owned property, under a divorce settlement
agreement that provides for transferring some assets in their entirety to
one spouse or the other, in a state that is not a community property state
is a nontaxable division and does not result in the realization of gain or
loss.98 “The dignity of co-ownership,” as the Court used the phrase in
Davis, is present when property is jointly owned and titled in both
names.99 Cohabiting adults who choose to hold property as joint tenants
should also be able to enjoy all the rights and privileges associated with
ownership, since substantive property rights accompany joint tenancy
under state law.100 Thus, the equal division of the total value of property
jointly owned and titled in both names of the cohabiting adults should
similarly be a nontaxable division of property between co-owners and not
a taxable event.101
91. Id. at 74.
92. Id.
93. Id. (“He exchanged these bonds…for other property of equal value, also jointly owned by
them.”).
94. Id.
95. Id. (“The effect of the divorce decree did no more than set apart to each in severalty the interest
they owned in their [joint] property.”).
96. Id. (“From the beginning the revenue laws have been interpreted as defining ‘realization’ of
income as the taxable event….”).
97. Rev. Rul. 81-292, 1981-2 C.B. 158.
98. cf. Rev. Rul. 73-476, 1973 -2 C.B. 300 (holding that IRC § 1031(a) precludes the recognition
of any gain or loss realized on an equal division of the total value of property held by three individuals as
tenants in common, thereby leaving open the possibility that gain or loss was realized, even if not
recognized, on the transfer of property held as tenants in common).
99. See United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65, 70 (1962).
100. See Morgan v. Comm’r, 309 U.S. 78, 80 (1940) (State law creates legal interests and rights in
property); see also, e.g., Libby v. Lorrain, 430 A.2d 37 (Me. 1981) (partition action disentangling the
property involvements of an unmarried couple who bought a house as joint tenants).
101. See also Rev. Rul. 74-347, 1974-2 C.B. 26 (describing an unequal division of jointly owned
property, pursuant to a divorce decree, and holding that realization occurs only with respect to the amount
in excess of an equal division of the jointly owned property).
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Division of Community Property

For federal income tax purposes, there are nine community property
states: Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico,
Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin.102 The community property system
is based on an equal economic partnership model in which the
contributions, financial or otherwise, made by each member of the
community are fully appreciated and equally valued.103 Three community
property states–California, Nevada, and Washington– make no
distinction between the community property laws affecting married
persons and the community property laws affecting domestic partners.104
Each member of the community equally contributes his or her industry
to its prosperity and possesses an equal right to succeed to its property.105
Therefore, each spouse or domestic partner is vested with an equal fifty
percent ownership interest in all community property. Community
property generally includes property acquired by a spouse or domestic
partner while domiciled in the state during the course of the marriage or
domestic partnership.106 For many of the same reasons that the partition
of joint property is a nontaxable event, it is well-established that no gain
or loss will be recognized from the approximately equal division of the
fair market value of community property in a community property state
under a divorce settlement agreement that provides for the transfer of
some assets in their entirety to one spouse or the other.107
Domestic partners are clearly unmarried couples108 who have full
community property rights under the laws of these three states.109
Certainly, the division of entity rationale which applies to the
approximately equal division of community property under a divorce
102. See DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, PUB. 555, CAT. NO. 15103C,
COMMUNITY PROPERTY (Mar. 2020). This Article does not address the federal tax treatment of income or
property subject to the “community property” election under Alaska, Tennessee, and South Dakota state
laws.
103. See Terry, Separate and Still Unequal?, supra note 19, at 646 (citations omitted).
104. All domestic partner references are to those domestic partners registered with the State of
California in accordance with CAL FAM. CODE §§ 297–299.6 (West 2021), and those domestic partners
registered with the State of Nevada in accordance with NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §122A.100 (West 2020),
and those domestic partners registered with the State of Washington in accordance with WASH. REV.
CODE. ANN. §§ 26.60.030–040 (West 2021).
105. See Susan Kalinka, Federal Taxation of Community Income: A Simpler and More Equitable
Approach, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 633, 637 (1990).
106. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 760 (West 2021); see also CAL. FAM. CODE § 297.5 (West 2021).
107. Rev. Rul. 76-83, 1976-1 C.B. 213; see Wren v. Comm’r, 24 T.C.M. (CCH) 290 (1965).
108. See Rev. Rul. 2013-17, 2013-38 I.R.B. 201; see also Smelt v. Cnty. of Orange, 447 F.3d 673
(9th Cir. 2006) (a domestic partner does not constitute a married individual); In re Rabin v. Schoenmann,
359 B.R. 242 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2007) (domestic partners are not identical to spouses).
109. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 297.5 (West 2021); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 122A.200 (West
2020); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.60.080 (West 2021).
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settlement agreement should similarly apply to the approximately equal
division of community property upon dissolution of a domestic
partnership.110 Thus, the approximately equal division between domestic
partners of the fair market value of community property upon dissolution
of a domestic partnership should likewise be a nontaxable transaction
with no gain or loss recognized to either domestic partner.
C. Transfer of Property to Satisfy an Equitable Interest in Property
Equitable distribution principles have been utilized to resolve property
disputes between cohabiting adults arising from the dissolution of their
relationship.111 Equitable distribution, which is not the same as equal
distribution, is generally defined as a fair and just meting out of property
between interested parties.112 It is a judicial division of property rights
and obligations between individuals. The court does not necessarily
divide the property equally, but attempts to make a fair and just allocation
after considering all relevant factors.113
110. See Rev. Rul. 76-83, 1976-1 C.B. 213 for explanation of the “division of entity rationale”
(When the aggregate fair market value of the community property received by or on behalf of each spouse
is approximately equal, such division is not a taxable event.).
111. See, e.g., Connell v. Francisco, 898 P.2d 831, 836 (Wash. 1995) (Income and property acquired
during a meretricious relationship is characterized as community property in the same manner as if the
couple had been married, and therefore, is subject to equitable division upon the dissolution of the
relationship); Goode v. Goode, 396 S.E.2d 430, 438-39 (W.Va. 1990) (While indicating a preference for
property division between unmarried cohabitating couples by contract principles, the court does allow for
equitable division of property in the absence of a contract provided a “party claiming relief must
demonstrate that equitable principles would provide the relief being sought.”); Wilbur v. DeLapp, 850
P.2d 1151, 1153 (Ore. Ct. App. 1993) (In making a property distribution upon the termination of the
relationship of a non-marital cohabiting couple, “[t]he primary consideration . . . is the intent of the parties.
However…in distributing the property of a domestic relationship, [the Court is] not precluded from
exercising [its] equitable powers to reach a fair result based on the circumstances of each case.”); Becker
v. Ashworth, No. 104,417, 252 P.3d 647, 2011 WL 2206635 (Kan. Ct. App. June 3, 2011) (per curiam)
(unpublished) (“Even if the parties were not married and merely cohabitated, the court may, in its
discretion, make an equitable division of property either jointly accumulated by the parties or acquired
with intent that both parties have an interest in the property.”).
112. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS, § 4.09, cmt. a (2002) (“The dominant model is ‘equitable distribution,’ in
which the governing statute provides a list of ‘factors’ that the trial judge is authorized or directed to
consider in deciding the fairest allocation of the property.”).
113. See WARDLE & NOLAN, supra note 18, §§ 700, 706 (factors considered in equitable
distribution include the length of the relationship; the age and physical and emotional health of the parties;
the income or property brought to the relationship by each person; the standard of living established during
the relationship; any written agreement made by the parties before or during the relationship concerning
property distribution; the economic situation of each person at the time the division of property becomes
effective; the income and earning potential of each person; the contribution by each person to the
education, training or earning power of the other person; the contribution of each person as to the
acquisition of any property as well as the contribution of a person as a homemaker; the tax consequences
to each person; the market and emotional value of the assets; the need for the custodial parent to remain
in the home and keep possession of household effects; the debts and liabilities and the ability of each
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Regardless of who holds title to the property, a person who has made
non-tangible contributions, such as domestic contributions to the
household, may claim an equitable interest in the property upon
dissolution of the relationship.114 These equitable rights only come into
identifiable form upon dissolution of the relationship; and when granted
by the court, they translate into ownership rights in the property.115 As a
result, under state law, the property is determined to be co-owned by both
parties. Accordingly, for federal income tax purposes, the transfer of
property to satisfy an equitable ownership interest is likely to be treated
as a nontaxable division of property between co-owners, even when only
one person held title to the property.
In Bosch v. United States,116 the Fifth Circuit held that the transfer of
real estate, which was titled solely in the husband’s name, constituted a
nontaxable division of property between co-owners because such real
estate was transferred to the wife to satisfy a special equity interest
awarded to her pursuant to her divorce decree.117 During her marriage,
Lillian Bosch advanced more than $115,000 of her own funds to her
husband to improve certain acres of land that were titled solely in his
name.118 On the basis of this financial contribution, a Florida divorce
court recognized a special equity interest that Lillian Bosch held in the
improved land.119 Florida has long recognized the vested ownership right
of a wife who contributed substantially to the growth and development of
her husband’s property.120 To satisfy this special equity interest, Mr.
person to pay those debts; any other factors the court deems appropriate); see also ECONOMIC RIGHTS OF
UNMARRIED COHABITANTS ACT, at 3 (Nat’l Conf. of Commissioners on Uniform State L., Discussion
Draft
2021),
available
at
https://www.uniformlaws.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=8
c8ca36d-9185-a9db-9fb4-5c53428a8e89&forceDialog=0.
114. See WARDLE & NOLAN, supra note 18, § 683 (“In response to the substantial disparity in
economic consequences of divorce for men and women in common-law states, legislation authorizing
judicial discretion to distribute some part of the property according to principles other than title began to
be passed in the twentieth century.”); see also AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 112, § 4.02 Reporter
Notes cmt. a (“By the mid-1980s, however, all common-law states had moved to some form of ‘equitable
distribution,’ under which the divorce court could allocate property on a basis other than title or the source
of earnings used to acquire it….”).
115. See WARDLE & NOLAN, supra note 18, § 684 ([an inchoate interest in the property acquired
by the other] “ripens into an [ownership] interest of variable scope and duration, depending on how the
judge sees the equities of the case.”).
116. Bosch v. United States, 590 F.2d 165 (5th Cir. 1979).
117. Id. at 168.
118. Id. at 166.
119. Id. at 166 (“The [divorce] court’s decree included the following finding: ‘That the defendant
(husband) is the owner of approximately 3500 acres of land, which is in the name of the defendant solely,
but which have been managed and improved by the use of plaintiff’s money, and in which the plaintiff
has a special equity.’”).
120. Id. at 167 (“Florida has long recognized a ‘special equity’ in a wife where she has made
identifiable contributions to her husband’s property during marriage even though the special equity only
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Bosch transferred one-third of the land to Mrs. Bosch.121 On the basis of
Florida law, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the divorce decree awarded
Lillian Bosch a vested property interest in the improved land.122 As a
result, the transfer of one-third of the land to Mrs. Bosch to satisfy her
special equity interest constituted a nontaxable division of property
between co-owners and did not constitute a taxable event.123
A related group of cases, including Imel v. United States124 (discussing
Colorado law), Collins v. Commissioner125 (discussing Oklahoma law),
and McIntosh v. Commissioner126 (discussing Montana law), determined
that, upon dissolution of the marriage, both spouses automatically possess
a vested interest in property held under a species of common ownership
jointly acquired during the marriage. Essentially, these cases held that in
every marriage the law of each respective state automatically grants
ownership rights in all marital assets to both spouses, regardless of who
actually holds title to the property, and such ownership rights vest upon
dissolution of the marriage.127 In each of these cases, the transfer to the
wife, pursuant to the divorce decree, of property titled solely in the
husband’s name was deemed a nontaxable division of property between
co-owners.128
In contrast, certain states reject the notion that both spouses in every
marriage possess an automatic vested interest in all marital property upon
divorce.129 Even in those jurisdictions, however, state law does recognize
that vested ownership rights might exist in property not titled in a person’s
name depending on the specific circumstances present in an individual
marriage.130 For example, in Cook v. Commissioner,131 the Tax Court
held, pursuant to a divorce decree, the transfer by a husband to his former
comes into actual identifiable form upon the termination of the marriage status.”).
121. Id. at 166.
122. Id. at 167 (“The parties agree that the question whether this decree was a division of property
interests between the parties or was an award in lieu of alimony is to be resolved by reference to state
law.”).
123. Id. at 168 (“We conclude that the Florida divorce court decree awarding the special equity to
the wife in this case constituted a division of existing property interests, and it did not constitute a taxable
event to the husband.”).
124. Imel v. United States, 523 F.2d 853 (10th Cir. 1975).
125. Collins v. Comm’r., 412 F.2d 211 (10th Cir. 1969).
126. McIntosh v. Comm’r, 85 T.C. 31 (1985).
127. Imel, 523 F.2d at 855; Collins, 412 F.2d at 212; McIntosh, 85 T.C. at 43.
128. Imel, 523 F.2d at 857; Collins, 412 F.2d at 212; McIntosh, 85 T.C. at 44-45.
129. See, e.g., Cook v. Comm’r, 80 T.C. 512, 522 (1983), aff’d per curiam, 742 F.2d 1431 (2d Cir.
1984) (“[T]he Supreme Court of Connecticut found that neither husband nor wife acquires by statute any
right in the property of the other…[that] amount to co-ownership.”).
130. See, e.g., id. at 528 (“Judge Dube believed that Sheila had some sort of interest in these
properties, tangible or intangible, legal or equitable, which became vested in her when the marriage
contract was dissolved.”).
131. Id. at 512.
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wife of stock and certain real property, which was titled solely in the
husband’s name, was a nontaxable division of property between coowners since the wife had an equitable interest in such property because
she and her family had given or sold the property to her husband.
Sheila and Charles Cook divorced in 1976.132 Sheila Cook was the
daughter of John Gamble, one of the founders and principal stockholders
of Proctor & Gamble (“P&G”).133 During the course of their marriage,
Charles Cook received shares of P&G stock as gifts from Sheila Cook
and her parents, and her parents also sold Mr. Cook certain real property
from the Gamble family estate.134 Under the circumstances, the divorce
court judge believed that Sheila Cook possessed some interest in these
properties, which became vested in her upon dissolution of their marriage,
even though legal title to the properties was undoubtedly exclusively in
Mr. Cook.135 Pursuant to the Connecticut equitable distribution statute,
the court ordered the transfer of P&G stock and certain real property to
Sheila Cook in the divorce decree.136 Given that the transfer of property
was made to satisfy Mrs. Cook’s vested interest in such property, the Tax
Court held that the transaction was not taxable to Mr. Cook and was a
nontaxable division of property between co-owners.137
Similarly, in Beard v. Commissioner,138 the Tax Court held that cash
payments from a husband to his former wife were not taxable and did not
constitute alimony because the cash payments were made to satisfy her
equitable interest in property that had been titled solely in his name.
Shirley Beard and Richard Patterson had been married 28 years when they
divorced in Michigan in 1975.139 Neither Ms. Beard nor Mr. Patterson
owned any property when they entered the marriage, so all marital
property had been jointly acquired during their marriage.140 Their largest
marital assets were shares of common stock in the family business–almost

132. Id. at 513.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 514-16.
135. Id. at 528 (“Judge Dube believed that Sheila had some sort of interest in these properties,
tangible or intangible, legal or equitable, which became vested in her when the marriage contract was
dissolved.”).
136. Id. at 527-28 (“[Judge Dube] apparently gave considerable weight to the last factor mentioned
in Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. sec. 46-51 which requires the divorce court to give consideration to the
contribution of each party in the acquisition of the assets in making a division of property.” (citations
omitted)).
137. Id. at 528 (“We conclude that under these particular circumstances, the transfer of the
properties was more in the nature of a division of property rather than a satisfaction of any marital
obligations of petitioner to Sheila.”); cf. Cook v. United States, 904 F.2d 107 (1st Cir. 1990).
138. Beard v. Comm’r, 77 T.C. 1275 (1981).
139. Id. at 1277.
140. Id.
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100% of which were held solely in Mr. Patterson’s name.141
Michigan law provides for equitable distribution of property upon
divorce.142 As such, the divorce court determined that Ms. Beard was
entitled to an equitable share of the marital property, regardless of who
actually held title to the property, because she had properly raised a family
and equally contributed to the family and business affairs.143 Since Mr.
Patterson would continue to operate the family business after the divorce,
it was agreed that Mr. Patterson would compensate Ms. Beard in cash for
the value of the shares of common stock that had been equitably
apportioned to her, with such cash payments to be paid in equal
installments over a certain period of time.144 The Tax Court concluded
that these cash payments were not taxable and did not constitute alimony
because the cash payments were not a support allowance, but instead were
made to satisfy Ms. Beard’s vested property interest in the shares of
common stock.145
Since equitable distribution principles have been extended to
cohabiting adults when considering the division of property upon
dissolution of their relationship, it certainly seems likely that a nontaxable
division of property will result, no matter whose name is on the title, when
property is transferred in satisfaction of an equitable property right.146
D. Cash Property Settlements
There are virtually no federal income tax cases that have been litigated
questioning the taxability of property transfers between cohabiting adults
upon dissolution of their relationship. There is, however, one case that
discusses the taxability of cash proceeds received from the settlement of
a lawsuit arising in connection with the dissolution of a cohabiting
relationship: Violet A. Reynolds v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.147
In Reynolds, Ms. Violet A. Reynolds petitioned the United States Tax
Court to redetermine her federal income tax liability.148 Ms. Reynolds
and Mr. Gregg P. Kent cohabited as an unmarried couple for twenty-four
141. Id. at 1278 (“In addition, the outstanding common stock of Shults Equipment was owned as
follows: Richard, 1965 shares; Richard and Shirley (jointly with rights of survivorship), 35 shares; and an
unrelated third party, 20 shares.”).
142. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 552.19 (West 2020).
143. Beard, 77 T.C. at 1279.
144. Id. at 1279-80 (“[Richard] shall pay the balance of $310,000.00 in monthly installments over
a 121 month period commencing November 1, 1975.”).
145. Id. at 1288-89 (“[W]e think that these payments more closely resemble a property settlement
than a support allowance.”).
146. See Cain, Taxing Families Fairly, supra note 3, at 825.
147. See Reynolds v. Comm’r, 77 T.C.M. 1479 (1999).
148. Id. at 1480.
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years before their relationship dissolved.149 In connection with the
dissolution of their relationship, Ms. Reynolds entered into a settlement
agreement with Mr. Kent.150 Pursuant to that settlement agreement, Mr.
Kent agreed to transfer certain property and cash to Ms. Reynolds in
exchange for her full and complete release of any claims to any real or
personal property acquired during their relationship that was titled in Mr.
Kent’s name or in the name of the company in which Mr. Kent was the
majority shareholder.151 The IRS argued that the transfer should be
included in the gross income of Ms. Reynolds as compensation for
homemaking services.152 Ms. Reynolds challenged the IRS and instead
asserted that the property and cash were excludable from her gross income
as gifts from Mr. Kent.153
The taxability of proceeds recovered in settlement of a lawsuit rests
upon the nature of the claim for which the proceeds were received and the
actual basis of recovery.154 Ascertaining the nature of the claim is a
factual determination that is generally made by reference to the settlement
agreement in light of the facts and circumstances surrounding it.155 The
Tax Court declared that the court must ask itself “in lieu of what was the
payment received?”156 The payment’s ultimate character depends on the
payor’s dominant reason for making the payment.157 The settlement
agreement indicated that Mr. Kent paid the disputed amount to Ms.
Reynolds in exchange for the surrender of her rights in most of the
property purchased during their relationship.158 Since the payor’s intent
controls the characterization of settlement proceeds, the Tax Court found

149. Id.
150. Id. at 1481.
151. Id. at 1482.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.(citations omitted).
155. Id.(citations omitted).
156. Id.(citations omitted).
157. Id.(citations omitted).
158. Id. (“The settlement agreement provided in pertinent part: WHEREAS, KENT in said case
contends that REYNOLDS has no right, title, or interest, or legitimate claim in and to the real and personal
property referred to therein, and further, KENT contends REYNOLDS has no right, title, or legitimate
claim to any real and/or personal property of KENT, whether alleged in the case or not, and further, that
Kent is not liable or responsible for any sums whatsoever; and WHEREAS, REYNOLDS contends that
she has a claim to said real and personal property and to other property, both real and personal, which
may belong to or stand in the name of KENT; and WHEREAS, each of the parties hereto disputes the
other's contentions: and WHEREAS, the parties, KENT and REYNOLDS desire to resolve their
respective differences concerning their respective claims and to memorialize their agreement resolving
those differences, and further, forever place the dispute behind them * * * * * * *
1. In consideration for the full and complete release by REYNOLDS of any claims of any nature, including
but not limited to, any sums of money, and/or claims to any real and/or personal property of KENT, KENT
agrees to pay REYNOLDS the following sums, on the following terms….”).
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that Mr. Kent intended to perfect his sole possession of most of their joint
property when he paid Ms. Reynolds the disputed amount.159
Interestingly, the Tax Court did not treat this transaction as a
nontaxable division of property between co-owners.160 Instead, the Tax
Court stated that the sale of her property interest to Mr. Kent was a taxable
event for which Ms. Reynolds must recognize gain to the extent the
selling price exceeded her basis in the property.161 The Tax Court,
however, determined that her basis in the property equaled or exceeded
the selling price, so there was no gain to be recognized, much in the same
way a nontaxable division of property between co-owners does not yield
any taxable gain.162 Therefore, it appears that even when an equitable
interest in property is exchanged for cash upon dissolution of a cohabiting
relationship, there is generally no taxable income to be recognized based
heavily on the facts and circumstances present.
III. THE TAXATION OF NONMARRIAGE
A.

Family Law as a Guide

The number of adults choosing to live together in exclusive, committed
relationships without marriage has steadily increased over the past few
decades.163 The rise in cohabitation has understandably led to questions
regarding property divisions between cohabiting adults upon dissolution
of their relationship. Many domestic relations courts and state legislatures
have been willing to address these questions as family law jurisprudence
more fully recognizes the changing landscape of the American family.164
159. Id. at 1483.
160. cf. Beard v. Comm’r., 77 T.C. 1275 (1981) (cash payment in settlement of property interest
deemed not alimony and not includible in income of recipient because “payments more closely resemble
a property settlement than a support allowance.”).
161. Reynolds, 77 T.C.M. at 1483; see 26 U.S.C. § 1001(a).
162. Reynolds, 77 T.C.M. at 1484; see 26 U.S.C. § 1015(a).
163. See Wang & Parker, supra note 4 (“After decades of declining marriage rates and changes in
family structure…the shares of adults cohabiting and raising children outside of marriage have increased
significantly.”).
164. See, e.g., Libby v. Lorrain, 430 A.2d 37 (Me. 1981) (partition action disentangling the property
involvements of an unmarried man and woman who bought a house as joint tenants); Connell v. Francisco,
898 P.2d 831, 836 (Wash. 1995) (Income and property acquired during a meretricious relationship is
characterized as community property in the same manner as if the couple had been married, and therefore,
is subject to equitable division upon the dissolution of the relationship); Goode v. Goode, 396 S.E.2d 430,
438-39 (W.Va. 1990) (While indicating a preference for property division between unmarried
cohabitating couples by contract principles, the court does allow for equitable division of property in the
absence of a contract provided a “party claiming relief must demonstrate that equitable principles would
provide the relief being sought.”); Wilbur v. DeLapp, 850 P.2d 1151, 1153 (Ore. Ct. App. 1993) (In
making a property distribution upon the termination of the relationship of a non-marital cohabiting couple,
“[t]he primary consideration…is the intent of the parties. However…in distributing the property of a
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As the IRS considers the federal income tax consequences of property
transfers between cohabiting adults upon dissolution of their relationship,
an interdisciplinary approach that incorporates principles of family law is
advisable.
Interdisciplinary work has been heralded as the path to creative
problem solving because it draws insight from other fields, involves
thinking across boundaries, and encourages the synthesis and integration
of knowledge across disciplines.165 When researchers from two or more
areas of study pool their approaches and modify them so that they are
better suited to the problem at hand, this amalgamation can truly benefit
society.166 Notably, some tax scholars have long advocated for an
interdisciplinary approach to solve tax problems.167
Regrettably, the myth that the law of taxation is fundamentally
different from other areas of the law persists.168 Tax myopia, a concept
discussed extensively by Paul Caron, is the tendency of the tax law to
view itself as an isolated body of law separate from other areas of law;
this misperception has impaired the development of tax law by ignoring
domestic relationship, [the Court is] not precluded from exercising [its] equitable powers to reach a fair
result based on the circumstances of each case.”); Becker v. Ashworth, No. 104,417, 252 P.3d 647, 2011
WL 2206635 (Kan. Ct. App. June 3, 2011) (per curiam) (unpublished) (“Even if the parties were not
married and merely cohabitated, the court may, in its discretion, make an equitable division of property
either jointly accumulated by the parties or acquired with intent that both parties have an interest in the
property.”); see also, e.g., ECONOMIC RIGHTS OF UNMARRIED COHABITANTS ACT, at 3 (Nat’l Conf. of
Commissioners
on
Uniform
State
L.,
Discussion
Draft
2021),
available
at
https://www.uniformlaws.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=8
c8ca36d-9185-a9db-9fb4-5c53428a8e89&forceDialog=0; CAL. FAM. CODE§ 297.5 (West 2021); NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 122A.200 (West 2020); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.60.080 (West 2021).
165. Janet Weinstein, Coming of Age: Recognizing the Importance of Interdisciplinary Education
in
Law
Practice,
74
WASH. L.
REV. 319,
322
(1999),
available
at
https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr/vol74/iss2/4 (“One aspect of creative problem solving that almost
all approaches have in common is its interdisciplinary nature.”).
166. Dave Owen & Caroline Noblet, Interdisciplinary Research and Environmental Law,
41 ECOLOGY L.Q. 887 (2015), available at https://repository.uchastings.edu/faculty_scholarship/1231
(“Interdisciplinary research…can be one of the most productive and inspiring of human pursuits—one
that provides a format for conversations and directions that lead to new knowledge.” (citations omitted)).
167. See, e.g., Paul L. Caron, Tax Myopia, or Mamas Don’t Let Your Babies Grow Up to be Tax
Lawyers, 13 VA TAX REV. 517, 531-54 (1994) (criticizing courts and commentators for ignoring nontax
developments in statutory construction and legislative process theory in advocating unique role for
legislative history in construing the Internal Revenue Code); Paul L. Caron, Estate Planning Implications
of the Right of Publicity, 68 TAX NOTES 95, 95-96 (1995) (criticizing courts for subjecting right of
publicity embodied in famous decedent's name to federal estate tax without consideration of how such
interests are treated under state property law); Paul L. Caron, The Role of State Court Decisions in Federal
Tax Litigation: Bosch, Erie, and Beyond, 71 OR. L. REV. 781 (1992) (criticizing courts and commentators
for inadequate attention to principles of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), in debate over
appropriate mechanism to determine the meaning of state law in federal tax litigation); Paul L. Caron,
When Does Life Begin for Tax Purposes?, 68 TAX NOTES 320, 324 (1995) (criticizing courts and Internal
Revenue Service for grappling over definition of "person" for tax purposes without consideration of how
the issue has been addressed in other areas of law).
168. Caron, Tax Myopia, supra note 167, at 531.
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insights from other areas of law that should inform the tax debate.169 The
taxation of property transfers between cohabiting adults presents an
opportunity to change or correct this myth and to engage in
interdisciplinary work in contravention of this myth. A crucial part of the
legal analysis will be missed if the taxability of property transfers between
cohabiting adults upon dissolution of their relationship is determined in
isolation of the principles of family law that are so fundamental to it.
B. The Primacy of State Law when Determining Property Ownership
In previous articles, this Author has discussed longstanding principles
in federal tax law which dictate that state law determines ownership and
creates property rights.170 This proposed framework reinforces those
principles. For more than a century, Congress has respected a state’s
determination of the property rights granted to its citizens for federal
income tax purposes. Unless Congress decides to remove that right from
the states, the IRS should respect a state’s determination of property rights
in accordance with principles of federalism. Several Supreme Court
decisions provide that state law controls in determining the nature of the
legal interest which the taxpayer has in property sought to be reached by
the federal income tax statute.171
Utilizing principles of family law to address critical tax questions is not
new. Federal tax law has a long tradition of looking to state law to
determine family relationships and ownership of property rights, while
federal tax law has determined how those property rights should be
taxed.172 An interdisciplinary approach that incorporates principles of
family law would enhance the taxpayer experience and improve the
administration of Congressional tax policies by eliminating uncertainty
and providing consistency in the law. Taxpayers would also be able to
engage in appropriate tax planning.
C. Substance over Form Prevails
Substance over form is a fundamental tax principle, which “provides
that the tax consequences of a transaction are determined based on the
underlying substance of the transaction rather than its legal form.”173 The
169. Id. at 518.
170. See Terry, Separate and Still Unequal?, supra note 19, at 641; Keeva Terry, Same-Sex
Relationships, DOMA, and the Tax Code: Rethinking the Relevance of DOMA to Straight Couples, 20.1
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 383 (2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1920852.
171. Terry, Same-Sex Relationships, DOMA, and the Tax Code, supra note 170, at 408.
172. Cain, Taxing Families Fairly, supra note 3, at 838.
173. Southgate Master Fund, L.L.C. v. United States, 659 F.3d 466, 479 (5th Cir. 2011) (citations
omitted).
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substance over form doctrine allows courts to recharacterize a transaction
so that its taxable form corresponds to its economic substance.174 The
Supreme Court has endorsed this doctrine.175 In applying the doctrine of
substance over form, the Supreme Court has looked to the objective
economic realities of a transaction rather than to the particular form the
parties employed.176
The reality is that many couples choose to live together and pool their
resources as one economic household. Substantively, cohabiting adults
face many of the same economic challenges as a married couple.
Therefore, when it comes to the dissolution of these relationships, the IRS
should consider the substance of the relationship to determine the
appropriate tax treatment. This approach comports with well-established
Supreme Court precedent.
In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court Holding Co., the
respondent corporation’s sole asset was an apartment building.177 The
corporation was owned by two individual shareholders.178 While the
corporation still had legal title to the apartment building, it negotiated the
sale of the property.179 An oral agreement was reached as to the terms
and conditions of sale, but soon after, the purchaser was advised by the
corporation’s attorney that the sale could not take place because it would
result in a large income tax to the corporation.180
The next day, the corporation liquidated its assets, which made the two
shareholders the new owners of the property in their individual
capacities.181 A sale contract was then executed between the new property
owners and the same purchaser with substantially the same terms and
conditions as previously negotiated by the corporation.182
The
Commissioner argued that, despite the liquidation of assets followed by
the transfers of legal title, the corporation had not abandoned the sales
negotiations and instead used mere formalities designed to make the
transaction appear to be something other than what it was in order to avoid
tax liability.183 The Supreme Court agreed and stated that the incidence

174. Southgate Master Fund, 659 F.3d at 479.
175. See Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 98 S. Ct. 1291 (1978).
176. Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 98 S. Ct. 1291, 1298 (1978); see Blueberry Land Co. v.
Comm’r, 361 F.2d 93, 101 (5th Cir. 1966) (“[C]ourts will, and do, look beyond the superficial formalities
of a transaction to determine the proper tax treatment.”).
177. 324 U.S. 331, 332 (1945).
178. Id. at 332–33.
179. Id. at 333.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
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of taxation depends upon the substance of a transaction.184 Therefore, the
transaction must be viewed as a whole, and each step, from the
commencement of negotiations to the consummation of the sale, is
relevant. The Court held that it was evident that the substance of the
transaction was a sale by the corporation rather than a sale by the
shareholders.185
The Court Holding Co. case illustrates how courts will take a holistic
view of the circumstances when determining the substance of a
transaction. One of the main considerations when determining the
substance of a transaction is the party’s motivation in conducting the
transaction. In other words, a party’s sole purpose for a transaction cannot
be for a tax benefit. Instead, a taxpayer must be able to demonstrate that
there was some non-tax motivation. Certainly, the motivation for
cohabiting adults is rarely to secure a tax benefit, so there is little risk of
subverting the legislative purpose of the Tax Code by taxing property
transfers between cohabiting adults using the interdisciplinary approach
of this proposed framework.
In PPL Corp. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the United
Kingdom privatized a number of government-owned companies, which
became significantly profitable.186 The U.K. subsequently imposed a
windfall tax to account for the excess profits earned by the companies
during the first four years of privatization.187 A U.S. taxpayer, who was
part owner of one of the affected companies, tried to take a foreign tax
credit for the windfall tax, but the Commissioner contended that the
windfall tax was not creditable for U.S. tax purposes.188 In its analysis,
the Supreme Court took a “commonsense approach.”189 The Court
considered the predominant character of the tax and followed the
substance over form doctrine to recognize that the U.K.’s windfall tax was
nothing more than an income tax (in the U.S. sense) on actual profits
above a certain threshold.190 The Court stated that the Commissioner’s
approach in reading the Tax Code was too rigid as “tax law deals in
economic realities, not legal abstractions.”191
The Court’s reasoning in rejecting the Commissioner’s restrictive
reading of the Tax Code is important, and it shows that the Tax Code
should be read and viewed adaptively so that it can encompass new

184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

Id. at 334.
Id.
569 U.S. 329, 331–32 (2013).
Id. at 332.
Id. at 334.
Id. at 331.
Id. at 338.
Id. at 340 (citations omitted).
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economic realities. This is important when considering cohabiting adults,
because the reality is that the number of people choosing to live together
without marriage is substantially increasing. Therefore, the need for the
IRS to provide guidance to cohabiting adults regarding the federal income
tax consequences of the dissolution of their relationship, and property
transfers resulting from such dissolution, has become more than an
economic reality – it has become an economic necessity.
In Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, Frank Lyon was Frank Lyon Co.’s
majority shareholder and board chairman. He also served on the board of
Worthen Bank.192 Worthen was planning the construction of a multistory
bank and office building.193 The bank, however, could not secure
approval of its initial plan because of certain rules under Arkansas law
and the regulations of the Federal Reserve System.194 Nevertheless, the
bank found a solution, which was to enter into a sale and leaseback
arrangement with Lyon Co. as the borrower and New York Life Insurance
Company as the lender.195 As a result of this new plan, Lyon Co. claimed
depreciation deductions on its federal income tax returns, which the
Commissioner challenged.196 The Supreme Court used the substance
over form doctrine to analyze the “objective economic realities” and
determine whether Lyon Co. was entitled to the deductions.197 The Court
concluded that this was not a sham business transaction and that it was
Lyon Co.’s capital that was invested (and consequently risked) in the
building according to the agreement.198 Therefore, Lyon Co. was entitled
to the depreciation deductions.199
Lyon is an important case because it highlights another factor courts
are encouraged to consider under the substance over form doctrine –the
actual investment and liabilities associated with the transaction. 200 This
analysis goes beyond just merely looking at motives or facts that may
have been incorporated in the decision-making process, but specifically
examines the investment made and the liabilities incurred by the taxpayer.
Considering the economic realities associated with cohabitating adults,
there is little doubt that these relationships often require significant
financial investment. When they dissolve, the emotional and financial
dissolution process bears a striking resemblance to that which married

192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

98 S. Ct. 1291, 1293 (1978).
Id.
Id. at 1293–94.
Id. at 1294.
Id. at 1296.
Id. at 1298.
Id. at 1300, 1302.
Id. at 1302.
Id. at 1303.
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couples experience upon divorce. As a result, the substance of these
relationships, not their form, should control and determine the tax
consequences of property transfers between cohabiting adults.
CONCLUSION
As our society evolves, so do our relationship structures, and so must
our Tax Code. In the twenty-first century, more and more couples who
choose to maintain exclusive, committed relationships have opted not to
marry. Many domestic relations courts and state legislatures have been
willing to address questions regarding property divisions between
cohabiting adults as family law jurisprudence more fully recognizes the
changing landscape of the American family.201 There is no need for
federal tax law to recreate the wheel. If a transfer is deemed a division of
property interests between the parties under state law, then for federal
income tax purposes, the transfer should similarly be deemed a
nontaxable division of property between co-owners. To ensure
consistency and uniformity, as the IRS prepares to strengthen its ability
to collect tax revenues, it is essential for the IRS to provide clear and
specific guidance to this growing group of taxpayers, thereby ensuring
they receive fair and equitable treatment.202

201. supra note 164.
202. See The American Families Plan Tax Compliance Agenda, U.S. Department of the Treasury
(May 2021), available at https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/136/The-American-Families-Plan-TaxCompliance-Agenda.pdf.
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